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1 INTRODUCTION
Since the early days of European integration in external affairs, policy-makers have
continuously emphasized the need to speak and act more coherently if the
European Union (EU) wants to become a more influential actor on the
international stage. In recent years, however, the relation between internal
coherence and external influence has been increasingly problematized by
academics. The empirical evidence suggesting that more coherence does not
necessarily lead to more influence is growing slowly.1 In this regard, one of the
crucial test cases implicates the area of trade and commerce, in which the EU has
achieved one of the highest degrees of internal coherence. The Rome Treaties
committed Member States early on to act collectively in international trade
negotiations.Most notably, the EU represents its Member States at theWorldTrade
Organization (WTO), as it had previously done at the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) meetings.2 Moreover, the EU has tried to improve its
coherence in these forums through various Treaty reforms in the 1990s and 2000s.
Yet, even with regard to matters of trade and commerce, increasing coherence has
not always brought about growing EU impact on international trade
negotiations.3 How is it possible to explain this?
As has been lamented already,4 little systematic research has been done to
answer this question.The few studies that examine the relation between coherence
and influence tend to emphasize different internal factors. Some highlight, for
example, the importance of how the negotiation competence is delegated within
the EU5 and related issues such as internal voting rules.6 Others point to
1 Karen E. Smith, Speaking with One Voice? European Union Co-ordination on Human Rights Issues at
the United Nations, 44 J. of Common Market Studies 1, 113–137 (2006); Karen E. Smith (2010),
The European Union at the Human Rights Council: Speaking with One Voice but Having Little Influence,
17 J. of Eur. Public Policy 2, 224–241 (2010); Alasdair R. Young, The Rise (and Fall?) of the EU’s
Performance in the Multilateral Trading System, 33 J. of Eur. Integration 6, 715–729 (2011); Daniel C.
Thomas, Still Punching below Its Weight? Coherence and Effectiveness in European Union Foreign Policy,
50 J. of Common Market Studies 3, 457–474 (2012); Arne Niemann and Charlotte Bretherton,
EU External Policy at the Crossroads: The Challenge of Actorness and Effectiveness, 27 International
Relations 3, 261–275 (2013).
2 The WTO was founded on 1 Jan. 1995 as a result of agreements reached during the Uruguay
Round. This international organization is the successor to the GATT and incorporates all the new
agreements reached during the Round.
3 Young, supra n. 1; Manfred Elsig, The EU as an Effective Trade Power? Strategic Choice of Judicial
Candidates in the Context of the World Trade Organization, 27 International Relations 3, 325–340
(2013).
4 Thomas, supra n. 1.
5 Joseph Jupille & James A. Caporaso, ‘States, Agency, and Rules: The European Union in Global
Environmental Politics’, in C. Rhodes (ed.), The European Union in the World Community (Boulder,
CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998); Sophie Meunier & Kalypso Nicolaïdis, Who Speaks for Europe? The
Delegation of Trade Authority in the EU, 37 J. of Common Market Studies 3, 477–501 (1999).
6 Sophie Meunier, What Single Voice? European Institutions and EU-U.S. Trade Negotiations, 54
International Organization 1, 103–135 (2000); Mark Rhinard & Michael Kaeding, The International
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efficiency problems when the EU spends more time negotiating for the sake of
internal cohesion among Member States and European institutions than
negotiating with third parties.7 Groenleer and van Schaick,8 for their part,
emphasize the importance of converging norms and preferences among Member
States. Likewise, Thomas emphasizes the importance of political cohesion within
the EU and the determinacy of its policies.9
However, these studies suffer generally from two shortcomings that make a
more systematic analysis of the relation between coherence and international
influence more difficult. The first problem is the lack of historical comparisons
within the same issue areas. So far, most studies offer single case studies or
comparisons between different issue areas.Yet, by comparing two similar cases in
the same issue area over time, it is possible to scrutinize in greater detail how in
some cases the EU maintains or increases its coherence, but is not able to
consolidate its influence. Second, other sources of power in international trade
negotiations,10 most notably external factors, often get obscured in favour of a
focus on internal coherence within the EU. Although some studies consider
external dimensions, for example in the form of recognition by third parties,11 or
in the form of the negotiation environment and ‘opportunity structures’,12 they
do not highlight sufficiently that, ultimately, influence in international affairs is
mutually dependent on the influence of other actors.
This article addresses these shortcomings by comparing two historical cases in
a special case of trade policy: agriculture, in particular international agricultural
negotiations that have taken place within two frameworks, namely the Uruguay
Round and the Doha Development Round (up to the Cancún Talks).We have
chosen this field of negotiations due to its specific characteristics. It is well known
that agriculture is different from other areas of trade due largely to the
interventionist nature of the Common Agricultural Policy and the disparity of
positions of EU Member States in this area. Hence, the EU negotiating position is
expected both to be linked intimately to what is going on domestically within the
Bargaining Power of the European Union in “Mixed” Competence Negotiations: The Case of the 2000
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, 44 J. of Common Market Studies 5, 1023–1050 (2006).
7 Smith, supra n. 1.
8 Martijn L.P. Groenleer & Louise G.Van Schaik, United We Stand? The European Union’s International
Actorness in the Cases of the International Criminal Court and the Kyoto Protocol, 45 J. of Common
Market Studies 5, 969–998 (2007).
9 Thomas, supra n. 1.
10 Peter Drahos, When the Weak Bargain with the Strong: Negotiations in the World Trade Organization, 8
International Negotiation 1, 79–109 (2003).
11 Jupille & Caporaso, supra n. 5.
12 Meunier, supra n. 6; Charlotte Bretherton, and John Vogler, A Global Actor Past Its Peak?, 27
International Relations 3, 375–390 (2013).
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CAP and to be less flexible than in other areas.13 This in turn should help
compare the impact of internal coherence on international influence in the two
Rounds.
This agriculture-specific analysis demonstrates that internal coherence cannot
explain the loss of the EU’s capacity of influence in international trade
negotiations. In other words, even though the Union’s coherence has hardly varied
in absolute terms, its influence has decreased in relative terms, that is, in relation to
other actors, particularly emerging powers in the global South. In short, external
factors have become dominant. Although the rise of new power centres is a
common theme in the recent literature on EU external relations,14 this article
examines how the power shifts in international commercial relations have
manifested themselves in the informal decision-making process of the Uruguay
and Doha Rounds. More specifically, by building a bridge between different
strands of literature in International Relations, EU studies and trade policy it
outlines three concrete processes that have undermined the EU’s influence over
time. First, the developing countries’ commercial power relative to the EU has
changed significantly to the detriment of the Union. Second, developing
countries, most notably Brazil, have been able to translate their increasing share in
international commerce by becoming effective coalition-builders in international
trade negotiations. Third, developing countries’ discontent with the results of the
Uruguay Round, as the benefits derived from the agreement were less than
expected, have strengthened their resolve in the negotiations themselves and have
furthered their willingness to contest the dominance of the EU and the United
States. These processes have been underpinned by ideational shifts regarding the
growth model in developing countries – shifts which have promoted greater
interest on the parts of these countries in international trade negotiations since the
Uruguay Round.
The structure of this article is threefold. First, we revisit briefly the concepts
of EU coherence and influence in the context of the sources of power in
international agricultural negotiations. The second section focuses on the
comparison of the Uruguay and Doha Rounds. It empirically shows both that it is
possible to compare the Doha Round up until Cancún with the Uruguay Round
in the field of agricultural negotiations and that the Cancún fiasco cannot be
explained by a decrease in EU internal coherence. Third, we examine why the
13 Sophie Meunier, Trading Voices: The European Union in International Commercial Negotiations
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005); Carsten Daugbjerg & Alan Swinbank, The Politics of
CAP Reform: Trade Negotiations, Institutional Settings and Blame Avoidance, 45 J. of Common Market
Studies 1, 1–22 (2007); Daugbjerg and Swinbank, Curbing Agricultural Exceptionalism: The EU’s
Response to External Challenge, 31 The World Economy 5, 631–652 (2008).
14 See, for example, Michael Smith, Beyond the Comfort Zone: Internal Crisis and External Challenge in
the European Union’s Response to Rising Powers, 89 International Affairs 3, 653–671 (2013).
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EU’s influence has decreased between Uruguay and Cancún by examining the
three processes outlined above in more depth. Finally, we summarize our research
findings in light of the existing literature and examine their policy implications.
2 BEYOND COHERENCE:REVISITING INFLUENCE INTRADE
NEGOTIATIONS
In international trade negotiations, the EU – like any other actor – can draw on
different sources of bargaining power to wield influence in its favour. One of these
sources is certainly the internal set-up of the actor.15 In the case of the EU, this
internal approach to bargaining power is reflected in the classical literature on EU
coherence, which habitually attributes the lack of EU influence in international
affairs to its lack of internal coherence.16 From this classical perspective, coherence
is largely seen as an institutional issue.That is, coherence (and thus more European
influence on the international stage) can be achieved through certain institutional
arrangements that foster the integration of Member States and their policies.17 In
this regard, the existence of common policies supported actively by EU
institutions and Member States are usually seen as a clear indicator of EU
coherence.18
This institutional view is particularly prevalent in the EU studies literature on
international trade, in which the relations between the Commission – the EU’s
agent in trade negotiations – and the Council and the Member States have
become the centre of attention. More specifically, the focus is on the variation in
the Commission’s autonomy vis-à-vis the Council and the Member States and,
thus, on the variation over time of the EU’s coherence.19 Whereas some argue that
the Commission is merely a ‘spokesperson with privileges’,20 with a limited
capacity to act independently of the control mechanisms of the Member States,21
15 Drahos, supra n. 10, p. 83.
16 Kathleen R. McNamara & Sophie Meunier, Between National Sovereignty and International Power:
What External Voice for the Euro?, 78 International Affairs 4, 849–868 (2002); Marcela Szymanski
and Michael E. Smith, Coherence and Conditionality in European Foreign Policy: Negotiating the
EU-Mexico Global Agreement, 43 J. of Common Market Studies 1, 171–192 (2005); Richard G.
Whitman, The EU: Standing Aside from the Changing Global Balance of Power?, 30 Politics S1, 24–32
(2010).
17 Simon Nuttall, ‘Coherence and Consistency’, in Christopher Hill & Michael Smith (eds.),
International Relations and the European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).
18 Thomas, supra n. 1.
19 Eugénia da Conceiçáo-Heldt, Who Controls Whom? Dynamics of Power Delegation and Agency Losses
in EU Trade Politics, 48 J. of Common Market Studies 4, 1107–1126 (2010).
20 Chad Damro, EU Delegation and Agency in International Trade Negotiations: A Cautionary Comparison,
45 J. of Common Market Studies 4, 883–903 (2007), p. 900.
21 Dirk De Bièvre & Andreas Dür, Constituency Interests and Delegation in European and American Trade
Policy, 38 Comparative Political Studies 10, 1271–1296 (2005); M. Shawn Reichert & Bernadette
M.E. Jungblut, European Union External Trade Policy: Multilevel Principal-Agent Relationships, 35 Policy
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others maintain that issues like the Commission’s broad negotiation mandates or its
privileged information of negotiations provide a high degree of autonomy.22 Thus,
Elsig claims: ‘The agent in the field of European Union trade policy has more
discretion than is usually the case for agents in international organizations.’23
Yet, despite their differences, all contributions to this debate have one major
aspect in common: they are dominantly inward-looking approaches that share, at
the end of the day, the underlying emphasis on coherence as a crucial source of
more influence.As a result, they often sideline the broader picture of international
trade negotiations, that is, they do not expound upon or identify in-depth external
factors that may influence the EU’s bargaining power in such negotiations. It
comes, therefore, as no surprise that this type of literature has difficulties in
explaining why variation in coherence, for example, in the form of more
Commission autonomy, should actually fail to make the EU more influential. A
look at the extensive literature on the EU’s international agricultural negotiations
does not reveal new insights either, as work in this field has primarily been
concerned with establishing whether there is a relationship between these
negotiations and the evolution of the common agricultural policy (CAP), for
instance on the link between the development of the CAP and EU positions in
international trade negotiations. In other words, scholars have analysed the extent
to which international negotiations and CAP reforms have influenced each other
rather than the sources of EU influence in the negotiations.24
Given these shortcomings, it becomes necessary to go beyond internal factors
in order to explain the variation of EU influence in international agricultural
negotiations. As Drahos pointed out in his analysis of international trade
negotiations, apart from internal coherence, there are at least three more basic
sources of bargaining power in international trade negotiations: (1) commercial
power in terms of an actor’s international market share; (2) the establishment of
Studies Journal 3, 395–418 (2007); Andreas Dür & Manfred Elsig, Principals, Agents, and the
European Union’s Foreign Economic Policies, 18 J. of Eur. Public Policy 3, 323–338 (2011); Arlo
Poletti, World Trade Organization Judicialization and Preference Convergence in EU Trade Policy: Making
the Agent’s Life Easier, 18 J. of Eur. Public Policy 3, 361–382 (2011).
22 Eugénia da Conceiçáo-Heldt, Variation in EU Member States’ Preferences and the Commission’s
Discretion in the Doha Round, 18 J. of Eur. Public Policy 3, 403–419 (2011).
23 Manfred Elsig, European Union Trade Policy after Enlargement: Larger Crowds, Shifting Priorities and
Informal Decision-Making, 17 J. of Eur. Public Policy 6, 781–798 (2010), p. 789.
24 Francesc Granell, Montserrat Millet & Patricia Garcia-Duran, ‘The WTO as a Determining Factor
for the CAP and the Euro-Mediterranean Process’, in Juan-Ramón Cuadrado-Roura & Maria
Teresa Fernández-Fernández (eds.), The Euro-Mediterranean Free-Trade Area (Madrid: Marcial Pons,
2005); Robert Ackrill, Adrian Kay & Wyn Morgan, The Common Agricultural Policy and Its Reform:
The Problem of Reconciling Budget and Trade Concerns, 56 Canadian J. of Agricultural Eco. 4, 393–411
(2008); Alison Burrell, The CAP: Looking Back, Looking Ahead, 31 J. of Eur. Integration 3, 271–289
(2009); Carsten Daugbjerg & Alan Swinbank, Explaining the ‘Health Check’ of the Common
Agricultural Policy: Budgetary Politics, Globalisation and Paradigm Change Revisited, 32 Policy Studies 2,
127–141 (2011); supra n. 13.
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effective networks to gather relevant commercial information; and (3) the ability
to build efficient coalitions.25 In the case of the EU, the information-gathering
networks were already well established during the Uruguay Round.26 As there is
no reason to believe that this factor varied substantially between the Uruguay and
Doha Rounds, the analysis of the other two factors is the most pertinent way
forward.The first one, the EU’s commercial power vis-à-vis other actors, has been
already identified as an important variable in international commercial relations
and is directly related to the concept of relative power in the International
Relations literature on cooperation. In this regard, the emergence of new powers
has been the most recurrent theme.27 As Blavoukos and Bourantonis have pointed
out in a recent volume, ‘…systemic changes, related not least to the ascendance of
new powerful actors in world trade negotiations (i.e., the BRIC countries – Brazil,
Russia, India and China, with Russia not yet a WTO member), have undermined
the EU international economic role’.28 The second factor, coalition-building
ability, has rarely come up in the literature on the EU.However, it has already been
shown how other actors in international trade negotiations, most notably
developing countries, have been able to increase their influence vis-à-vis the US
and the European Union by forming counter-coalitions.29
Before analysing whether these factors are actually related to EU influence in
the agricultural negotiations in Uruguay and Doha, it is first necessary to define
what is meant by ‘influence’. Although the term is certainly murky and widely
debated, it is directly related to the relatively straightforward concepts used in
other studies on EU foreign policy, in particular goal attainment,30 the
‘effectiveness in impact’31 or simply ‘impact’ in the sense of ‘effects of EFP
[European Foreign Policy] activity on international political and functional
issues’.32 Following the definition of these concepts ‘influence’ can be defined as
instrumental power, that is, as the ability to affect outcomes in line with the EU’s
25 Drahos, supra n. 10, pp. 82–83.
26 Ibid., p. 83.
27 Young, supra n. 1; Elsig, supra n. 3; Lisanne Groen & Arne Niemann, The European Union at the
Copenhagen Climate Negotiations: A Case of Contested EU Actorness and Effectiveness, 27 International
Relations 3, 317–318 (2013).
28 Spyros Blavoukos & Dimitris Bourantonis, ‘Conclusion’, in Spyros Blavoukos and Dimitris
Bourantonis (eds.), The EU Presence in International Organizations (London: Routledge, 2011), p.
174.
29 Amrita Narlikar & Diana Tussie (2004), The G20 at the Cancun Ministerial: Developing Countries and
Their Evolving Coalitions in the WTO, 27 The World Economy 7, 947–966 (2004); Drahos, supra n.
10.
30 Niemann & Bretherton, supra n. 1, pp. 267–268.
31 Elsig, supra n. 3, p. 328.
32 Roy H. Ginsberg, The European Union in International Politics: Baptism by Fire (Lanham, MD:
Rowman & Littlefield, 2001), p. 49.
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common policies. As in the case of the related concepts, it is essential to link the
observed effects with the actual activities implemented by the EU.33
3 FROM URUGUAYTO CANCÚN:THE EU INAGRICULTURAL
NEGOTIATIONS
For more than twenty-five years, intense international agricultural negotiations
have taken place within the Uruguay and the Doha Development Round. This
analysis does not attempt to explain in detail the agricultural negotiations that
took place in the two rounds or the details of the different actor positions in the
negotiations. Rather we present the analysis of the EU’s key role in these
negotiations in a comparative way so as to highlight two points. First, that the
comparison should be made between the negotiations that took place as part of
the Uruguay Round with those of the Doha Round up to the Cancún Talks.
Second, that even though the Union’s coherence has hardly varied in absolute
terms between both rounds, its influence has decreased in relative terms.
3.1 THE VALIDITY OF THE COMPARISON
The peculiarities regarding the two rounds suggest comparing the Uruguay
Round through to its completion and the Doha Round only to the Cancún
Ministerial (instead of up until now or up until the 2008 revised draft modalities).
As explained below, the similarities are stronger between these two periods making
the comparison methodologically more attractive.
The Doha Round up until now only shares two similarities with the Uruguay
Round. The first similarity regards the relations between the EU and the other
actors.The recognition of the EU both as a valid and key actor in the international
trade negotiations was not called into question by the creation of the WTO in
1995.While in the GATT the European Economic Community (EEC) was a de
facto contracting party, formal or legal recognition of the EU as an actor in its
own right came with the creation of the WTO. Moreover, recognition of the EU
as an international actor has always gone hand in hand with its power status.The
EU has been recognized by its peers, both in the GATT and the WTO, as a key
actor in trade negotiations due to its market size and the volume of trade it
generates.34
33 Thomas, supra n. 1, pp. 460–461.
34 Ole Elgström, Outsiders’ Perceptions of the European Union in International Trade Negotiations, 45 J. of
Common Market Studies 4, 949–967 (2007); Caterina Carta, ‘Close Enough? The EU’s Global
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The second similarity is related to the framework of negotiations. In Uruguay,
as in Doha, multilateral agricultural negotiations centred on three main pillars:
market access, export subsidies, and domestic support – and could not be totally
disassociated from other issues concerning trade in goods (above all those related
to market access for non-agricultural products, trade defence measures, and issues
of intellectual property) and services, included on the agendas of both rounds. In
both cases, the negotiations have been subject to the ‘overall approach’, now
referred to as the ‘single undertaking’, by which nothing is agreed until everything
is agreed. In other words, if there is no agreement on agriculture, the Round
cannot be concluded – even though agreements might have been reached in
negotiations concerning goods and services and vice versa.The development that
would have represented a significant change between Uruguay and Doha did not
materialize. We refer to the exclusion of the agenda of three of the so-called
Singapore issues: competition policy, investment and government procurement. For
this reason, it can be argued that the Doha principle of single undertaking covers
the same topics as discussed in Uruguay.35
The Uruguay Round and the Doha Round up until Cancún share three
other important similarities. The first has to do with the internal EU model of
governance. During the Uruguay Round and up until Cancún, the model of
governance adopted before the GATT/WTO was the same. The Member States
granted the EU exclusive competence in its Common Commercial Policy and
allowed the Commission full representation powers in international trade
negotiations under the Council’s supervision. During that period, the EU had
exclusive competence in the field of trade in goods (including agricultural
products), and it had shared competence with the Member States in the area of
services, intellectual property, and foreign direct investment.Moreover, the fact that
the competence of the EU was not exclusive in all these new areas of commerce
did not impede its unity of representation in the international trade negotiations in
Uruguay or in Cancún. In practice, the European Commission represented the
Member States in all the facets of the broad negotiation agendas at both Rounds,
operating within the framework of the guidelines laid down by the Council.36
This model of governance has been changed by the Lisbon Treaty. The scope of
Role Described by Non-European Diplomats in Brussels’, in Sonia Lucarelli & Lorenzo
Fioramonti (eds.), External Perceptions of the European Union as a Global Actor (Abingdon: Routledge,
2010);Young, supra n. 1.
35 Bart Kerremans, ‘Delegation Chains, Agenda Control and Political Mobilization: How the EU
Commission Tries to Affect Domestic Mobilization on the DDA’, in Thomas Cottier and Manfred
Elsig (eds.), Governing the World Trade Organization: Past, Present and beyond Doha (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2011).
36 Stephen Woolcock & Michael Hodges, ‘EU Policy in the Uruguay Round’, in Helen Wallace and
William Wallace (eds.), Policy-Making in the European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1996); Meunier, supra n. 13.
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the Common Commercial Policy has been extended and the European Parliament
has been granted new powers in this arena.37
Second, we can also find important similarities in relation with the EU’s
negotiating position. Both in Uruguay and in Cancún, the position was initially
defensive.The EU wanted to preserve its common agricultural policy at all costs,
while third countries sought to persuade the EU to reform it by offering greater
market access, a reduction in export subsidies, and a reduction of domestic support
to its farmers. Agricultural negotiations did not really begin until the EU reached
an internal agreement to reform the CAP: in May 1992 for Uruguay and in June
2003 for Cancún. In both cases, these reforms expanded the EU’s margins for
negotiating the three pillars of agricultural policy. Although the EU introduced
some changes to the CAP both in 2008 and in 2013, analysts agree that these
cannot be considered reforms but revisions to adjust the policy instruments and/or
to finish the implementation of previous reforms.38 If we consider that policy
reform implies at least a change in the policy instruments that operate across the
sector as a whole (or most parts of it), the CAP has so far gone through only two
reforms: the MacSharry Reform in 1992 and the Fischler Reform in 2003.39
From this point of view, therefore, one may argue that 2003 for Doha was the
negotiating time equivalent to 1992 for Uruguay.40
Finally, and most importantly, both in Uruguay and in Cancún the EU tried
the same negotiating strategy. In both cases the EU reached a bilateral agreement
on agricultural issues with the US as the first step towards a multilateral agreement
on agricultural issues and of a successful conclusion of the Round. Since then
there have been no further attempts at reaching a bilateral agreement with the US.
3.2 DECREASING INFLUENCE, STATIC COHERENCE
On the basis of both these similarities and the classical literature on coherence, one
would expect the EU negotiating strategy to have had the same degree of success
37 Stephen Woolcock, European Union Economic Diplomacy (Farnham: Ashgate, 2012).
38 Alan Swinbank, CAP Reform in the Shadow of the Eurozone Crisis and Deliberations over the 2014-20
Financial Framework (communication for the First Conference of the Associazione Italiana di
Economia Agraria e Applicata (AIEE) on ‘Towards a sustainable Bio-economy: Economic Issues
and Policy Challenges’, University of Trento, 4–5 Jun. 2012); Patricia Garcia-Duran & Montserrat
Millet, The European Financial Crisis’ [lack of] Impact on the Doha International Trade Negotiations on
Agricultural Issues (communication for Stockholm University Workshop on ‘The Euro Crisis – A
Catalyst for Change? Examining the Effects of the Financial Crisis on European Union Policy?’,
18–19 Apr. 2013).
39 Wyn Grant, Policy Instruments in the Common Agricultural Policy, 33 West European Politics 1, 22–38
(2010).
40 We are very much aware that from other viewpoints this equivalence is more dubious. The 1992
CAP reform came late on in the Uruguay Round process.With Doha, however, many things were
still up in the air, including the ‘Singapore Issues’.
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in both cases unless evidence is found of a change in internal coherence. This
section shows, however, that while the EU level of influence was greater in
Uruguay, the degree of coherence was at least equal in Cancún.
In Uruguay, as in Cancún, the EU and the US reached a bilateral agreement
for the liberalization of agriculture. However, this bilateral agreement only became
a multilateral agreement in Uruguay. In Cancún, the other parties to the
negotiations rejected the bilateral agreement.
In Uruguay, in November 1992, the EU signed a bilateral agreement with the
US, which was subsequently accepted by the other participants in the Round and
which allowed a final agreement to be reached. This bilateral agreement was
known as the Blair House Agreement, and it effectively exhausted the margin for
negotiation offered by the May 1992 CAP reform. In fact, France accused the EU
of having exceeded this margin. In Doha, bilateral negotiations between the US
and the EU also resulted in a joint proposal. The proposal was presented on 13
August 2003 and served as the basis for the draft presented by the WTO in
Cancún. Thus, the Blair House model, which had helped unblock agricultural
negotiations during the Uruguay Round, was reproduced.This time, however, the
strategy failed. A new coalition, the Group known as the G20, was unwavering in
its opposition to the US-EU agreement; the G20 presented an alternative proposal
with greater demands for the liberalization of the three pillars of agricultural
negotiations. In short, the EU and the US were not able to affect the outcomes of
the Cancún talks in the same way as they had done during the Uruguay Round.
Yet, the EU’s waning influence between the two rounds can hardly be
attributed to the classical culprit in the literature: the hoarse single voice. In both
Uruguay and Cancún, the reforms of the CAP served to ensure the convergence
of the Member States around a common negotiating position. Following
Thomas,41 such a common position – and its pursuit by EU institutions and
Member States in the bilateral negotiations with the US – have been clear
indicators of similar EU coherence. Furthermore, in both Rounds, the EU only
became fully integrated in the agricultural negotiations after reaching an internal
agreement for the reform of the CAP in May 1992 and in June 2003 respectively.
Before the reforms, the differences between the positions of the Member States
were so marked that EU had only been able to submit defensive proposals in
support of the status quo, leaving the Commission without room for negotiation
in agricultural issues.
Although both reforms targeted only one of the pillars of international
agricultural negotiations, that of domestic support, they allowed the EU to
broaden its margins for negotiating the other two pillars. Protection from third
41 Thomas, supra n. 1.
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countries in the farming sector (the market access pillar) and the need to employ
export subsidies (the export subsidies pillar) are to a large extent the result of
having established a system of internal intervention. Thus, if the degree of
intervention is reduced, the degree of protection from third countries can also be
reduced.42 The literature on the negotiations indicates that these reforms
facilitated the Commission’s negotiating task.43
To sum up, the international agricultural negotiations that have taken place
within Uruguay and Cancún present strong similarities allowing for a
methodologically sound comparison. The comparison, nevertheless, does not
support the tenets of the classical literature on coherence. It reveals that internal
coherence cannot explain the EU’s decreasing ability to influence the negotiation
outcomes.
4 THE RISE OFTHE REST ANDTHE CHALLENGETO EUROPEAN
INFLUENCE
An analysis of the international context during the Uruguay and Doha Rounds
suggests that the key to understanding the different levels of influence wielded by
the EU in these negotiations lies in changes in the power structure governing
international trade negotiations. Both in GATT and WTO trade negotiations,
decisions are made by consensus.What changed from Uruguay to Cancún is the
way in which this consensus is reached. ‘Since Cancún, the old certainties about
the structure and players in agriculture negotiations have been undermined’.44 The
42 Although a reform of the degree of intervention of the CAP in Europe’s internal market has
implications for the necessary degree of external protection (or the EU’s margin for negotiation),
it is also true that these implications are not clearly defined in the reform. Thus, we agree with
Young (supra n. 1) that the most controversial aspects of the international trade negotiations on
agriculture within the Council, following the reform, were those relating to market access and
export subsidies.
43 Hugo Paemen & Alexandra Bensch, Du GATT à l’OMC: La Communauté européenne dans
l’Uruguay Round (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1995); John Croome, Reshaping the World Trading
System: A History of the Uruguay Round, (London: Kluwer Law International, 1999); Montserrat
Millet, La Regulación del Comercio Internacional: Del GATT a la OMC (Barcelona: La Caixa, 2001);
Bart Kerremans, What Went Wrong in Cancun? A Principal-Agent View on the EU’s Rationale Towards
the Doha Development Round, 9 European Foreign Affairs Review 3, 363–393 (2004); David N.
Balaam, ‘Agricultural Trade Policy’, in Brian Hocking & Steven McGuine (eds.), Trade Politics
(London: Routledge, 2004); Meunier, supra n. 6; Daugbjerg & Swinbank, supra n. 13; Woolcock &
Hodges, supra n. 36; Meunier, supra n. 13.
44 Robert Wolfe, New Groups in the WTO Agricultural Trade Negotiations: Power, Learning and Institutional
Design, Canadian Agricultural Trade Policy Research Network Commissioned Paper, CP 2006-2
(2006), p. 2.
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‘Duo’ formed by the US and the EU in agricultural negotiations has been replaced
by a ‘Quad’ formed by the US, the EU, Brazil, and India.45
During the Uruguay Round, the decision-making process was in practice the
one that had been in place since the birth of the EEC.The US and what is now
the EU as a ‘Duo’, or together with Japan and Canada as a ‘Quad’, formed the
basic core around which the consensus was built. This system reflected the
commercial power of these nations46 as well as the principal supplier rule
established by the GATT – according to which it was implicitly accepted that the
countries with the greatest stake and/or interest in the matter under negotiation
should wield the most influence in any decisions reached regarding that matter.47
In Doha, by contrast, the developing countries, and India and Brazil in particular,
managed to assume a new role in the decision-making process in agricultural
issues through the so-called G20 coalition. In Cancún, the G20 was able to prevent
the US-EU bilateral agreement from being accepted by the rest of the WTO
members as it had been in Uruguay.As Laïdi put it: ‘The Cancún experience had
great political significance because it revealed the emerging countries’ capacity to
agree on a defensive political agenda in relation to theWest, despite their diverging
long-term interests.’48
4.1 PROCESSES OF CHANGE
Arguably, the emergence of this ‘new Quad’ can be attributed to three processes
that were underpinned by ideational shifts regarding the growth model in
developing countries. Until the end of the 1980s, developing countries followed a
growth model based on import substitution. It was a model that required high
levels of protection, which is why the GATT model based on reciprocal tariff
concessions did not suit developing nations. In fact, in the early years of the
GATT, the agendas of these countries were concerned with obtaining
non-reciprocal concessions to secure access to the markets of developed countries.
All such demands were disputed and negotiated in the UNCTAD, a United
Nations forum created in 1964 specifically to address all issues related to trade and
45 Although since 2003 different constellations have been tried out, involving four to seven states, the
members of the G4 or new Quad have been part of all of them. See Amrita Narlikar, International
Trade and Developing Countries: Bargaining Coalitions in the GATT & WTO (London: Routledge,
2003).
46 Richard H. Steinberg, In the Shadow of Law Power? Consensus-Based Bargaining and Outcomes in the
GATT/WTO, 56 International Organization 2, 339–374 (2002); Meunier, supra n. 13; ibid.
47 Mary E. Footer, ‘The WTO as a Living Instrument’, in Thomas Cottier and Manfred Elsig (eds.),
Governing the World Trade Organization. Past, Present and beyond Doha (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2010); Millet, supra n. 43.
48 Zaki Laïdi, BRICS: Sovereignty Power and Weakness, 49 International Politics 5, 614–632 (2012), p.
618.
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economic development, on the grounds that the GATT’s system of consensus was
considered unsuited to achieving their demands.49 The outcome of the resulting
agreements was the formalization of a special and differential treatment provision
for developing countries in the GATT, via an exemption to the principle of
reciprocity (1964), the creation of the Generalised System of Preferences (1971),
and the introduction of the Enabling Clause (1979).
These achievements, however, resulted in the passive participation of the
developing countries in the GATT. It might be said that they acted as free riders –
in that they were excluded from trade negotiations, and so did not have to reduce
their protection levels, but still benefited from the tariff reductions negotiated by
the developed countries through the Most Favoured Nation clause.50 The price
they paid for this was the small degree of trade liberalization achieved in their
main areas of interest in the GATT: trade in agricultural products and textiles.
Parallel to the preparation and subsequent development of the Uruguay
Round, however, a change was being experienced in the growth model of many
developing countries, induced by the structural adjustment programmes
implemented to resolve the external debt crisis of the 1980s.The realization that
the import substitution model prevented the development of the export sector and
resulted in largely uncompetitive firms encouraged the opening-up of trade and
the elimination of trade restrictions as a means of revitalizing their economies.51
As a result, the developing countries began a unilateral process of trade
liberalization that has contributed to a change both in their trade relations and in
their traditional attitude to international trade.These changes have in turn led to
the three processes that are behind the creation of the ‘new Quad’.
The first process has been a shift in global commercial power in favour of the
developing countries. As is well known, in the 1990s, the so-called emerging
economies gradually acquired a greater share of the world’s markets. Therefore,
although the EU and the US remain the heavyweights of world trade, various
developing countries have gained considerable ground in global economic and
commercial systems, especially when operating as members of coalitions.
Specifically, the G20 has sufficient political and economic influence to be a major
actor in the agricultural trade negotiations conducted under the Doha framework.
49 This process was led by the G77, a coalition of developing countries that campaigned for a new
system of economic relations that might actually respond to the needs of economic development.
50 The developing countries were not entirely marginalized. In fact, they used their influence in the
consensus vote to ensure that the agendas of the Kennedy (1964–1967) and Tokyo Rounds
(1973–1979) included issues of interest to them, albeit that this did not result in any specific
agreements as these issues were gradually diluted in the course of negotiations. See Steinberg, supra
n. 46.
51 World Bank, World Development Report (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1987); Jagdish Bhagwati, El
Proteccionismo (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1991); Millet, supra n. 43.
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It includes the four BRICS countries (Brazil, India, China, and South Africa) that
were WTO members – Russia only joined the WTO in summer 2012 – and was
the first coalition to include China. In the agricultural sector, it represents 69% of
the world’s farmers, more than half the world’s population, and 26% of global
agricultural trade.
The second cause of the change in the nature of international agricultural
negotiations between Uruguay and Doha is the discontent with the results of the
Uruguay Round manifested by the developing countries.This was evident at the
WTO Ministerial Conference held in Seattle in 1999, where these countries
refused to agree to a new round of trade negotiations unless the Uruguay
agreements were renegotiated.52 Their refusal was justified on two grounds. First,
the expected benefits of the liberalization of trade in agricultural products and
textiles had not been forthcoming.53 Second, the costs generated by the
implementation of the new Uruguay agreements, especially as regards intellectual
property rights and sanitary and phytosanitary measures, had been great.54 This
explains why these countries have since placed the liberalization of trade in
agricultural products at the top of their agenda and blocked the negotiation of any
new trade issues.
Finally, the third process leading to the creation of a ‘new Quad’ has been the
progressive change in general attitude of the developing countries towards
international trade negotiations. The G20 is, in part, a response to this change in
thinking among the leaders of the developing countries. The fact that many
developing countries have come to accept that trade very much forms a part of
their development model has led them to have an interest in being active
participants in international trade negotiations. As a result, these countries have
developed an interest in becoming effective coalition-builders in international
trade negotiations despite their very diverse agricultural trade interests.
52 John S. Odell, Breaking Deadlocks in International Institutional Negotiations: The WTO, Seattle, and
Doha, 53 International Studies Quaterly 2, 273–299 (2009); Sergi Sahin, Tracing the Repeated Failure
of the Doha Development Trade Round from a Neo-Gramscian Perspective (communication for the 22nd
World Congress of Political Science (IPSA), Madrid, 8–11 Jul. 2012).
53 World Bank, Global Economic Prospects (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2004); Rashid S. Kaukab,
‘Coalitions and Alliance Strategies for Developing Countries in the Doha Round of Agricultural
Negotiations’, in Alex F. McCalla and John Nash (eds.), Reforming Agricultural Trade for Developing
Countries. Key Issues for a Pro-Development Outcome of the Doha Round (Vol. 1) (Washington, DC:
World Bank, 2007); Narlikar, supra n. 45.
54 J. Michael Finger, Implementing the Uruguay Round Agreements: Problems for Developing Countries, 24
The World Economy 9, 1097–1108 (2001); World Bank, Global Economic Prospects (Washington,
DC:World Bank, 2002).
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4.2 COALITION-BUILDING AMONG DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
This attitude shift began during the Uruguay Round.The first attempt at making
the voices of developing countries heard was embodied by the G10, a coalition of
developing countries led by Brazil and India, whose aim was to boycott the
inclusion of trade in services in the Uruguay Round talks. The inability of the
developing countries to reach a consensus, however, caused the group to split.The
second attempt was made through the adoption of a completely innovatory
strategy: forging alliances with developed countries.
The first alliance built on these lines resulted in the so-called Café au Lait
coalition, formed by a group of developing countries that included dissidents from
the G1055 (though neither Brazil nor India were among its members) and the
group of developed countries known as the G9.56 Canada’s presence in both the
G9 and the Quad provided the necessary link for reaching an agreement with the
US, the EU, and Japan and for launching the Round in September 1986. During
the Round, another coalition with the same characteristics played an important
role in the agricultural negotiations.The Cairns Group pushed for the inclusion of
agricultural negotiations on the agenda of the Round and supported the US’s calls
for liberalization.57
This change of attitude and strategy by the developing countries has been
strengthened and consolidated as the Doha Round has progressed. The mixed
coalitions of the Uruguay Round did not seek to oppose or question the great
powers; what they sought to do was to restrict their behaviour or, at least, to
influence it.Thus, the Café au Lait coalition sought to influence the issues on the
agenda during the Uruguay Round, so that it would include matters of interest to
both developing and developed countries. Meanwhile, the Cairns Group accepted
the US-EU bilateral negotiations that led to the Blair House Agreement. In Doha,
by contrast, the developing countries have wanted to play the game on their own
and to assume the role of an effective counterforce.58
The G20, unlike the Cairns Group, is not a mixed coalition. Formed
exclusively of developing countries, the group is led by Brazil and India and
55 This group was formed by Bangladesh, Chile, Colombia, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Ivory Coast,
Jamaica, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Philippines, Romania, Singapore, Sri Lanka, South Korea,
Thailand, Turkey, Uruguay, Zambia, and Zaire.
56 The G9 was formed by Australia, Austria, Canada, Finland, Iceland, New Zealand, Norway,
Sweden, and Switzerland.
57 The Group consists of Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica,
the Philippines, Guatemala, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Paraguay, South Africa, Thailand,
and Uruguay. It was officially constituted on 3 Aug. 1986.
58 It should be noted that the G20 was not the only coalition of developing countries created for
the Doha Round agricultural negotiations. There were other issue-based coalitions, such as the
G33, as well as regional groups such as the African Group and formal criteria-based groups such
as the Group of Least Developed Countries. Nevertheless, most commentators agree that the G20
JOURNAL OF WORLD TRADE1072
counts China and South Africa among its members. The composition of this
coalition began to take shape at the June 2003 meeting in Brasilia, when Brazil,
India, and South Africa signed an agreement of mutual political trust.
Subsequently, and in light of unfolding events, the group expanded.59 This group
was formed to reject the US-EU pact on agriculture presented at the September
2003 Cancún Ministerial Conference.This pact sought to reproduce the situation
at the Uruguay Round (following the Blair House Agreement), and the G20 did
not allow this to happen.
Coalition-building has not been easy among developing countries. One may
argue that the G20 owes its origins to a change of strategy on the part of the
Brazilian government in theWTO.60 In fact, in the G20, Brazil has been willing to
temper its liberalizing ambitions in agriculture and to accept the demands of the
more protectionist countries, such as India and China, centred on the protection of
rural agriculture and on special and differential treatment.61 Brazil’s leadership
effort may be attributed to a change in the orientation of the country’s foreign
policy.62 Under its former President Lula da Silva, Brazil old ‘globalist’ perspective
was largely abandoned and replaced by a ‘global South’ strategy. ‘The idea of Brazil
as a bridge between the North and the South was firmly entrenched in Brazilian
foreign policy during the Lula years’.63 As a result, Brazil has sought and continues
to seek to lead the defence of the interests of the developing countries – above all
on matters related to international commerce.64 It has taken up the North-South
discourse of the mid-late 1980s’ G10.
is a particular case. As Kaukab put it: ‘This was the first time that a developing country alliance
had worked as an active negotiating group instead of as a broader agenda-setting coalition’ (supra
n. 53, p. 142).
59 The original countries of the G20 were: Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa
Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, India, Mexico, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, the
Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, and Venezuela. Later there were changes in the composition of
the group: Egypt and Kenya joined, but various South American countries withdrew under
pressure from the US.
60 Sean W. Burges, Brazil as a Bridge between Old and New Powers?, 89 International Affairs 3, 577–594
(2013).
61 Mateo Diego-Fernández, Trade Negotiations Make Strange Bed Fellows, 7 World Trade Review 2,
423–453 (2008); Haroldo Ramanzini Júnior & Marcelo Passini Mariano (2013), Brazil and the
G-20: Domestic Pressures and the Construction of the Negotiating Position in the Doha Round of the
WTO, 47 J. of World Trade 6, 1203–1224 (2013); Kaukab, supra n. 53.
62 Sean W. Burges, Consensual Hegemony: Theorizing Brazilian Foreign Policy after the Cold War, 22
International Relations 1, 65-84 (2008).
63 Burges, supra n. 60, p. 580.
64 Marcus de Faro de Castro & Maria Isabel Valladao de Carvalho (2003), Globalization and Recent
Political Transitions in Brazil, 24 International Political Science Review 4, 465–490 (2003);
Charalampos Efstathopoulus (2012), Leadership in the WTO: Brazil, India and the Doha Development
Agenda, 25 Cambridge Review of International Affairs 2, 269–293 (2012); Ramanzini & Mariano,
supra n. 60.
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In any case, the EU has found itself facing a much more complex situation in
Doha, characterized by a resurgence of the traditional confrontation between
North and South and by the increased capabilities of the developing countries of
theWTO to form sufficiently influential coalitions through which to achieve their
goals. What we are seeing is a new international stage: on which the emerging
countries wish to play a leading role in decisions that have a global impact and
where agriculture has become the main item on their agenda.
Furthermore, this stage does not seem likely to change in the foreseeable
future. The G20 has consolidated its position in the WTO and has managed to
survive the pressures for its dismantling both during and after Cancún.65 Narlikar
and Tussie have argued that this group has managed to survive for several reasons:
first, because it combines two types of coalition, one centred on the defence of an
issue and one centred on the defence of its bloc interests; second, because it has
successfully found a balance between the distinct aspirations of its members; third,
because it is technically well prepared; and, fourth, because it is constructive, i.e., it
is willing to negotiate.66
5 CONCLUSIONS
In recent years, it has been possible to observe a number of cases where the EU’s
high degree of internal coherence has not been matched by the ability to affect
outcomes in international affairs. Surprisingly, this phenomenon occurs not only
in less developed common policy areas such as foreign and security affairs, but also
in traditional core policies of the EU, most notably the CAP. This suggests that
coherence as such is not a sufficient condition for more EU influence on the
international stage and, consequently, should not be over-emphasized, as many
policy-makers do. In international agricultural trade negotiations in particular,
even more European coherence through internal adjustments of decision-making
procedures or more Commission autonomy would hardly change the overall
outcomes of these negotiations.As has been shown by a diachronic comparison of
two instances of international agricultural trade negotiations during the Uruguay
and Doha Rounds, it has been rather the change in the nature of the negotiating
context that has weakened the influence of the EU in these negotiations. More
specifically, underpinned by ideological changes regarding trade negotiations in the
context of the GATT and WTO, emerging powers such as Brazil have played
increasingly pro-active roles in the negotiations and have proven to be effective
coalition-builders – to the detriment of the EU and US. In short, emerging
65 The US, for example, put pressure on various G20 countries to leave the group if they wanted to
negotiate a bilateral free trade area.
66 Supra n. 28.
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powers have learnt to translate their growing commercial power into effective
strategies to wield more influence in international trade negotiations.
So far, this influence is still limited.The ‘decline of theWest’ is still waiting to
happen, as Cox already argued.67 During the Cancún talks of the Doha Round,
for example, developing countries were only able to block a new
‘Blair-House-style’ agreement. However, they could not impose their own
agreement on the EU and US. Nevertheless, comparing the influence of the EU
relative to that of emerging powers during the Uruguay and Doha Rounds, the
trend over time becomes evident: the relative influence of the EU has declined.
Similar developments have also occurred in other areas, most notably with respect
to international environmental negotiations (Kilian and Elgström, 2010).68
Therefore, the habitual analyses of the internal working mechanisms inside the EU
are not sufficient to grasp fully the EU’s global influence. In this sense, there exists
a gap between what is being researched and the ability to link EU policies with
certain outcomes at the international level. Likewise, reducing the external
dimension of this influence merely to a vaguely defined increase in the
commercial power of other actors – as has become all too common – simplifies
too much the realities on the ground. In order to better understand the EU in
international affairs it is necessary to analyse how other international players act –
and, above all, interact with each other and with the EU. In international
negotiations, this interaction is reflected by the willingness and ability to build
effective coalitions. In other words, it is not only important to ascertain what third
countries think of the EU, but also how their actions impact the EU’s room for
manoeuvring.
What are the policy implications that arise from these research results? To
begin with, the correlation between EU coherence and influence is not as obvious
as policy-makers and think tank reports want to make us believe. More coherence
is not a panacea for the EU’s shortcomings in international affairs.Yet, coherence is
not a counter-productive factor either.The point is rather that the attention should
shift from too narrow a focus on coherence to other factors that are equally or
even more important. In the case of international trade negotiations, the research
results suggest at least two concrete steps. First, the EU has to more consciously
adapt its negotiation approaches to new negotiation environments. Simply forming
blocks centred on the EU-US axis no longer works in the same way as before.
This implies that the EU has to pay more attention to effective pre-negotiation
strategic planning than to fine-tuning internal coordination or to hammering out
67 Michael Cox, Power Shifts, Economic Change and the Decline of the West, 26 International Relations 4,
369–388 (2012).
68 Bertil Kilian & Ole Elgström, Still a Green Leader? The European Union’s Role in International
Climate Negotiations, 45 Cooperation and Conflict 3, 255–273 (2010).
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stringent common negotiation positions. More specifically, the EU has to learn
(again) to engage other actors on an individual basis and prevent the emergence of
strong counter-coalitions, in particular among emerging powers. Improved
coordination with the US or better use of issue linkages with other trade areas are
just two examples of how to achieve this. Second, the EU, and in particular
Member States, must adapt their expectations to what can be realistically achieved
in international negotiations.After all, the increasing influence of emerging powers
means that it is not possible anymore to achieve major negotiation results without
painful concessions.This is particularly true in the agricultural sector.
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